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ABSTRACT
We analyze the impact of firm-specific stock market liberalization events on
the capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms from emerging
market economies. We differentiate between firms based on their ownership
structures at the time of liberalization and analyze their post-liberalization
behavior regarding corporate financing decisions. Our empirical results show
that single–class-share firms (typically with stronger corporate governance
and better information environments) respond differently to their dual–
class-share counterparts. Liberalization results in lower debt reliance for the
former group while the latter lengthen the maturity of their debt portfolios.
Jel Classification: F30; G15; G32.
I. INTRODUCTION
Programs aimed at promoting financial market integration through the elimi-
nation of barriers to international investment have long been advocated for
emerging market economies. These programs have been undertaken both at the
country and corporate level. The latter being the result of achieving ‘investable’
status through corporate reforms or by international cross-listing on a larger,
more developed exchange. The extant literature documents the realized benefits
of such programs as improved operating performance, greater access to finance
and accelerated corporate growth (see among others, Lins et al. 2005 and
Khurana et al. 2008 for the cross-listing approach; Henry, 2000 and Mitton,
2006 for the investability route; and Flavin and O’Connor, 2010 for the sole and
joint effects of the alternative paths to liberalization). Typically, the empirical
literature treats all firms as equal (by controlling for firm-specific characteristics)
and reports results for the average firm. Recently, a number of studies, e.g. Bae
and Goyal (2010) and Mitton and O’Connor (2012), have reported heteroge-
neous responses to liberalization programs across firms with different operating
structures prior to the event. We extend this line of research to corporate
financing decisions by analyzing if pre-liberalization ownership structures, and
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associated differences in corporate governance and information environments,
may potentially result in heterogeneous responses post liberalization.
In particular, we analyze changes to corporate financing decisions – capital
structure and debt maturity – of emerging market firms in the aftermath of
firm-specific liberalizations. This issue has already attracted attention, but our
main innovation is to take account of differences in pre-liberalization owner-
ship structures and analyze if these result in differing post-liberalization
responses. Pindado and De la Torre (2011) provide a theoretical framework (and
supporting empirical evidence) in which ownership structures influence firms’
capital structures. Chen et al. (2012) show that for US firms, there are significant
differences in both debt maturity and leverage ratios between family- and
non–family-owned firms. We compile a sample of 1382 firms from 24 emerging
economies and divide firms into two groups; ‘single–class-share’ (SC) and ‘dual–
class-share’ (DC) firms. Durnev and Kim (2005) show that in firms where
control rights exceed cashflow rights (e.g. DC firms), corporate governance
standards tend to be lower than in firms where no (or much smaller) differences
exist between control and cashflow rights (e.g. SC firms).1 Governance prob-
lems, arising from DC structures are common in emerging markets (see
Claessens et al. 2002; and Lins, 2003). Because cashflow and voting rights are
separated under such a mechanism (in contrast to a one-share-one-vote system),
controlling shareholders can expropriate wealth from the firm for their own
benefit at very low personal cost (see DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Grossman
and Hart 1988; and more recently, Masulis et al. 2009). It has also been shown
that DC firms have more acute informational asymmetries than SC firms (see
Lim 2010; and Li et al. 2012). Such agency and informational costs can impose
greater financing constraints on DC firms and results in higher costs of capital
as investors often demand a larger premium to hold their stock (see Claessens
et al. 2002; Lins 2003; Durnev and Kim 2005). Therefore treating SC and DC
firms as equal may mask important differences in corporate financing because of
their ownership structures and their associated levels of corporate governance
and information asymmetries. Based on the extant theoretical and empirical
literature, we develop testable hypotheses as to how financial liberalization is
expected to influence corporate financing decisions and how differences are
likely to emerge between firms with different ownership structures.
Therefore, our study synthesizes two areas of research, namely the relation-
ship between financial liberalizations and corporate capital and debt maturity
structure; and that between corporate transparency (governance and informa-
tion regimes) and debt maturity. Recent empirical evidence suggests that capital
and debt maturity structures are likely to be influenced by the quality of
corporate governance (e.g. Jiraporn et al. 2012) and by informational asymme-
tries (e.g. Bharath et al. 2009). Hence, stock market liberalizations may impact
1 Li and Zaiats (2012) examine the corporate governance structures of dual-class share firms,
and show that some of these firms do adopt what would commonly be accepted as desirable
governance practices.
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firms differently when different ownership structures are in place prior to the
event. These liberalizations have the potential to strengthen corporate gover-
nance and increase the disclosure of information by improving managerial
accountability and the protection afforded to shareholders (see Kim and Singal
2000).2 If this is correct, and Bae et al. (2006) support this view, we should then
expect to see changes in firms’ capital structures in the direction implied by
improvements in corporate governance and/or a reduction in information
asymmetries. Chen et al. (2012) find that improvements in transparency
produce differential effects for family and non-family firms, with stronger
effects found for the former. Combining the findings from these two areas
provides motivation for analyzing the role of pre-liberalization ownership
structures in determining firms’ responses in relation to financing decisions
subsequent to achieving ‘investable’ status. Our empirical results support our
hypotheses; pre-liberalization ownership structures do influence the financing
decisions of SC and DC firms post-liberalization, but not in a homogeneous
manner.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypoth-
eses regarding the expected post-liberalization changes to corporate financing
behavior. Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 discusses the econometric
methodology and reports our empirical findings. Section 5 presents a number of
robustness checks, while section 6 concludes.
II. DEVELOPING TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
We are guided by the existing theoretical and empirical literature in developing
testable hypotheses regarding the behavior of SC and DC firms post liberaliza-
tion. Our first hypothesis concerns the capital structure of all firms and is stated
as follows;
Hypothesis 1: Investability is associated with reduced dependence on debt
financing for all firms.
The act of being deemed investable can impact on the financing behavior of
firms through two distinct – but potentially related – channels. Firstly, invest-
ability is associated with better corporate governance. Improvements in corpo-
rate governance reduce the agency costs between minority stakeholders and the
controlling majority and thus reduce the need for leverage to mitigate such
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Grossman and Hart, 1982). Jiraporn et al.
(2012) provide empirical evidence that better corporate governance leads to
lower dependence on debt financing. Secondly, liberalization events are also
associated with improvements in the information environment. Prior research
(Lang et al. 2003; Bae et al. 2006) has documented that cross-listings and stock
market liberalizations improve firms’ information environment. From the
2 Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) emphasize the role played by foreign
institutional investors in improving corporate governance.
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pecking-order theory of financing behavior (Myers and Majluf 1984), reducing
information asymmetries may also alter the capital structure of firms by decreas-
ing the relative importance of debt in favor of more information-sensitive
equity. Bharath et al. (2009) present empirical evidence that information asym-
metries are an important determinant of capital structure decisions. Therefore
both channels reinforce each other and are arguably interrelated, because
improvements in corporate governance are likely to lead to greater transparency
and fewer information asymmetries. Indeed, Armstrong et al. (2012) show that
governance improvements lead improvements in a firm’s information environ-
ment. Consequently, we expect investability to be associated with lower debt
dependence for both SC and DC firms.
Our second hypothesis focuses on the composition of firms’ debt portfolios.
Hypothesis 2: Investability is associated with a lengthening of the maturity
of debt portfolios for all firms.
As with our first hypothesis, both the corporate governance and information
channels underpin this hypothesis. The reduction in agency costs associated
with the former will alleviate the need for short-term debt to act as a monitoring
device and may result in a shift toward long-term debt whose more infrequent
rollovers reduce the monitoring benefits of debt. As before, the information
channel predicts a similar shift in financing behavior. Because long-term debt is
more information sensitive than short-term debt, the pecking order theory
implies that firms will re-balance their debt portfolios toward longer maturity
debt instruments as information asymmetries are reduced. Thus we expect that
investability will be associated with increases (decreases) in long- (short)-term
debt financing.
Our final hypothesis predicts differential effects on corporate financing deci-
sions for SC and DC firms, thus making the pre-liberalization ownership struc-
ture an important factor in post-liberalization behavior.
Hypothesis 3: Investability may be associated with differential effects on
the corporate structures of firms with different pre-liberalization ownership
structures. Post-liberalization, all firms will move along the financing hierar-
chy but not necessarily in a homogeneous way.
This prediction relies heavily on the observation that these firms are different
before the event and thus their ability to reap the rewards of investability may
be impacted by their initial conditions. Recent empirical literature documents
differential outcomes to liberalization programs between firms with different
operating structures and restrictions prior to the event. Bae and Goyal (2010)
show that firms with better governance regimes before the event reap the
greatest benefits of stock market liberalizations, while Mitton and O’Connor
(2012) find that pre-liberalization levels of financing constraints influence valu-
ation gains subsequent to liberalization.
Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003), among others, suggest that gover-
nance and informational deficiencies are particularly relevant for emerging
market economies. Therefore, the hypothesized post-liberalization behavior is
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again based on how investors respond to firms reducing agency costs and
information asymmetries. Both types of firms will move toward instruments
that are more information sensitive and offer reduced monitoring benefits. SC
firms, who enjoy a higher quality of corporate governance and information
transparency before the event, are better positioned to take advantage of their
newly achieved investable status. Given that SC firms have better governance
and greater information disclosure, they are likely to be further along the
financing hierarchy when investability is achieved and hence, the liberalization
event is expected to be associated with a substitution of debt for equity financ-
ing. In contrast, DC firms are likely to experience greater financing restrictions
pre-investability because of the problems associated with this ownership model.
Hence, DC firms are more reliant on short-term debt, which is best at mitigating
agency costs and is least sensitive to informational asymmetries. Therefore the
liberalization event may not immediately allow them to replicate the behavior
of their SC counterparts. While we anticipate a move along the pecking order,
the step from short- to long-term debt financing may be more feasible than
directly accessing equity markets. Investability will help to alleviate the prob-
lems associated with this ownership structure, but may not fully overcome the
agency and informational costs connected to it.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION
We collect data on a large sample of firms from all emerging economies with
at least one ‘investable’ firm over the period 1980–2000. From this we identify
all firms that were deemed investable over our sample period using the ‘invest-
able’ measure from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Emerging
Market Database. A firm is deemed to be investable if its stock is free from
country-level and firm-level restrictions on foreign investment. Furthermore,
stocks are required to have sufficient size and liquidity to be realistically avail-
able to foreign investors. We categorize a firm as investable in a given year if
its stock appears in the IFC investable index by December of that year. For
inclusion in our final sample, a number of conditions must be fulfilled. First,
firms must have (financial) data available in both the pre- and post-investable
periods. All firms (investable and non-investable) must have a minimum of 3
years financial data and, in addition, non-investable firms must have at least
1 year of data available prior to the median year in which firms first become
investable in their native country. Following the imposition of these require-
ments, our final sample comprises of 1382 firms from 24 countries. Four
hundred and two firms are investable and 980 are non-investable. India pro-
vides the largest number of firms (223) and Slovakia the least (4). The greatest
number of investable firms comes from Malaysia (63), while Sri Lanka has just
one investable firm. Full details of the sample are given in Table 1.
Firms are classified as either SC or DC using the ‘Currently a Multiple Share
Company’ identifier from Worldscope. Multiple share companies are defined as
‘. . . companies which currently have more than one type of common/ordinary
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share.’3 Our sample contains 107 DC and 295 SC investable firms. All countries
have at least one investable SC firm with Malaysia (63) and Korea (58) together
accounting for over 41% of these firms. Mexico provides the greatest number of
investable DC firms (18), although many countries have none.
The final columns of Table 1 report the year in which firms first become
investable. The first SC and DC firms both became investable in 1988. There is
considerable variation across countries, e.g. the first Argentine, Greek and
Malaysian firms became investable in 1988, while firms from the Czech Repub-
lic (1998) became investable much later.
In our analysis, we employ two widely used measures of corporate debt;
namely ‘Book Debt’, (the ratio of total debt to total book assets), and ‘Net Debt’,
(total debt less cash to total assets). We capture firms’ debt maturity structure
using long- and short-term debt to assets, long- and short-term debt to equity,
and long-term debt to total debt. We also analyze the effect of investability on
corporate capital structure (total debt to equity). Following convention, we
exclude financial firms from our final sample and control for firm-specific
factors commonly employed in related studies (see Schmukler and Vesperoni
2006; Agca et al. 2007; Mitton 2007).4 Profitability is calculated as the ratio of
earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to
total assets; growth opportunities as the ratio of market-to-book value of assets;
tangibility as the ratio of fixed to total assets; and firm size as the log of sales
(inflation-adjusted and in $US).5 All variables are sourced from Worldscope and
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
IV. REGRESSION ESTIMATES
A. Econometric methodology
Normally, in these situations, we would use a fixed-effects model to estimate the
effect of investability on the debt and debt maturity structures of firms, while
controlling for other factors. However, the specification we would like to adopt
here has a time-invariant variable, the DC firm dummy, which is crucial to the
analysis, and therefore a traditional fixed-effects model is not very useful.
Therefore, we adopt a relatively new estimation technique, which is designed to
3 Durnev and Kim (2005) classify DC firms as those whose control/voting rights exceed cash
flow rights by at least 10%. Because we do not have access to ownership data, we rely on the
Worldscope classification.
4 Barclay and Smith (1995) and Datta et al. (2005) restrict their sample to firms with Standard
Industry Classification codes between 2000 and 5999. Without access to these codes, we use
the general industry classification data item provided by Worldscope and assign firms to one
of six industrial groups: industrial, utility, transportation, bank/savings and loan, insurance,
and other financial. To be consistent with others, we only use the first three classifications.
5 We prefer to use sales, rather than total assets to proxy for firm size, since the latter is used to
construct all of the firm-level variables employed in the analysis. The results are similar when
we use total assets to proxy for firm size.
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allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables; namely, the fixed-effects
vector decomposition (FEVD), which was proposed and developed by Plumper
and Troeger (2007, 2011).6
This approach proceeds in three steps. In the first step, the (firm) fixed effects
are retrieved from a fixed-effects regression:
Y X Year eit it t i it= + + + +α β μ (1)
where the dependent variable is one of the debt or debt maturity ratios out-
lined earlier for firm i in year t. Xit is a set of firm-level controls (size, prof-
itability, growth opportunities and tangibility), and Yeart is a complete set of
year dummies.7 mi captures the unit or firm-fixed effects. Indeed it captures
all the time-invariant factors, both observable and unobservable, that
might be included in the model. In the second stage, we run an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression of these fixed effects on the time-invariant
variables.
μˆ υ β εi i i= + +DC 2 (2)
Hence, the estimated fixed effects are decomposed into a part explained by the
time-invariant variable i.e. the dual-class dummy, and an unexplained part,
captured by the error term from this second stage regression. The unexplained
component contains all other time-invariant factors, such as country and indus-
try effects, and these enter into the third stage through the inclusion of this
‘error term’ from (2). The final stage is then estimated by pooled OLS and
includes all time-variant and invariant variables:
Y X Investable Investable DC DC Yearit it it it i i t= + + + × + + +α β β β β1 2 3 4 ε ε2i it+ (3)
where in addition to the variables defined earlier, DCi is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for a DC firm and zero for a SC firm; Investablei,t is a dummy
variable, which equals one if the firm is deemed investable in year t, and
(Investablei,t ¥ DCi) is the interaction of the investable and dual-class dummy. All
regressions are estimated with standard errors clustered at the firm level.8 Here
the coefficient b2 captures the average impact of investability for SC firms on the
dependent variable, while b4 captures the average impact of being a DC firm. For
a DC firm, the total effect of becoming investable is given by b2 + b3. All the
effects are measured relative to the omitted benchmark group, i.e. SC non-
investable firms.
6 Others to use the FEVD approach include Lensink and van der Molen (2010), Davies et al.
(2008), and Akhter and Daly (2009).
7 We follow Lensink and van der Molen (2010) by including time fixed effects (year dummies)
in both the first and third steps of the FEVD regressions.
8 Plumper and Troeger (2007) suggest that estimating stage 3 by pooled ordinary least squares
requires that heteroscedasticity and serial correlation be dealt with. Hence, we correct the
standard errors for potential clustering across firms. Clustered standard errors are, by con-
struction, robust to heteroscedasticity.
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As with many issues in corporate finance,9 the potential problem of endoge-
neity makes it difficult to infer a causal relationship in our analysis. The ideal
solution would be to use an Instrumental Variable estimation approach, but it
is difficult to identify a suitable instrument for the investable dummy. Instead
we concentrate our efforts on ensuring that we minimize cross-sectional differ-
ences between investable and non-investable firms. We include firm fixed-
effects in our estimations to control for the time-invariant firm characteristics,
while also including a number of observable firm-specific variables to control
for time-varying firm effects. Mitton (2006) adopts a similar approach to mini-
mize cross-sectional differences, leaving the investable dummy to pick up
‘within-firm or time-series variation’. Admittedly, we cannot be certain that all
cross-sectional differences have been eliminated so we prefer to interpret our
results as showing how liberalization is associated with changes to the capital
structure rather than claiming causality.
B. Pre-liberalization financing patterns
Before we test our hypotheses, we must first establish that pre-liberalization SC
and DC firms are indeed different as suggested by the theoretical and empirical
literature reviewed earlier. Given the importance of these pre-liberalization
differences for hypothesis 3, we want to confirm that these patterns are also
present in our data. Table 2 presents results from regressing our dependent
variables on a DC dummy and the relevant control variables for all pre- and
non-investable firms. As expected, we see differentiating features between SC
and DC firms, consistent with the greater expropriation risk borne by investors
in the latter group. DC firms have higher leverage ratios, while there are also
important differences in debt maturity structure. In particular, DC firms employ
more (less) short- (long-) term debt and this is consistent with DC firms being
further down the pecking order of finance and/or investors requiring greater
monitoring of these firms. Similarly, Guney and Ozkan (2005) find that the
greater the wedge between cashflow and control rights, i.e. deviations from
one-share one vote, the greater the use of short-term debt. They suggest that this
is a voluntary decision to mitigate the agency costs associated with such an
ownership structure.
C. Testing our hypotheses
Our coefficient estimates from estimating Eq. (3) with either book debt or net
debt as the dependent variable are presented in Table 3. Primarily, we focus on
the coefficients on the dummy variables and the interaction term. These results
provide mixed empirical support for our first hypothesis, namely that invest-
ability is associated with lower dependence on debt financing. For SC firms,
9 Roberts and Whited (2012) provide a survey of the extent of endogeneity problems in
empirical corporate finance.
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investability is clearly associated with a lower dependence on debt relative to
their non-investable counterparts. However, for DC firms we cannot reject the
hypothesis that investability has no effect on debt levels. Even though the sum
of the relevant coefficients is negative, it is not significantly different to zero.
Therefore debt financing only appears to become less important for SC firms
post-liberalization.
An interesting hierarchy of debt employment emerges from this analysis. DC
firms are the largest users of debt and in particular non-investable DC firms.
Interestingly, the non-significance of the interaction term suggests that invest-
ability has roughly the same impact on debt variables whether the firm is SC or
DC. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are such that even though DC
firms lower their debt ratios post-liberalization, they still hold more debt than
SC firms. So the hierarchy has DC non-investable firms at the top and SC
investable firms at the bottom in terms of reliance on debt financing. It is
noteworthy that DC firms use more debt financing than their SC counterparts.
It could be argued on theoretical grounds that DC firms should use less debt
than SC firms, because debt serves to dilute the private benefits of control in the
former as creditors can monitor and may impose constraints on the controlling
manager’s behavior via debt covenants. Our results imply the opposite, with DC
firms using relatively more debt financing. This is consistent with the empirical
findings of Francis et al. (2005), Dey et al. (2009), and Harvey et al. (2004), who
Table 3 Investability, debt and dual-class firms
Debt Ratio
Book Debt Net Debt
Investable -0.011*** (3.68) -0.015*** (4.10)
Investable ¥ DC 0.003 (0.55) 0.006 (1.03)
DC 0.042*** (11.51) 0.029*** (5.96)
Firm size 0.011** (2.16) 0.020*** (3.67)
Growth opportunities 0.011*** (2.90) 0.010 (1.62)
Tangibility 0.087*** (3.19) 0.421*** (11.62)
Profitability -0.529*** (15.15) -0.614*** (15.93)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ DC) 0.31 0.07
# Obs 9,803 9,803
R2 0.769 0.782
This table reports coefficient estimates from fixed effects vector decomposition regressions with
t-statistics (absolute value) adjusted for firm-level clustering presented underneath. The depen-
dent variable is book debt (total debt to total assets) or net debt (to assets), as indicated. Investable
is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable.
DC is an indicator variable, which is 1 if the firm is a dual-class share firm. Firm size as the log of
real sales in US$; growth opportunities is book value of debt plus market capitalization to book
assets; tangibility is calculated as fixed assets to total assets, and profitability as earnings before
interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization to total assets. Also estimated but not reported
are a constant, and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for
the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. #Obs is the number of observations.
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show that the greater the ratio of managerial voting to cashflow rights, the
greater the use of debt financing.10 Similarly, Chong (2010) finds that the greater
the discrepancy between voting and cashflow rights in a firm, the greater the
use of bank (debt) financing. This preference for debt financing may be due to
a number of factors. Billet and Liu (2008) show that, while the cost of bond
financing is higher for DC firms (compared with SC firms),11 it is still preferred
because as the wedge between voting and cashflow rights widens (managers and
shareholders’ interests diverge), the cost of debt relative to equity declines. Debt
may also be preferred as the cost of equity financing is likely to be even higher
for these firms, (see Jarrell and Poulson 1988), implying that greater the use of
debt financing may not be by choice. The relatively higher employment of debt
is also consistent with the notion that debt and ‘good’ corporate governance are
substitutes for one another (see Jensen 1986; and Stulz, 1990). Both Jiraporn
and Gleason (2007) and Arping and Sautner (2010) present empirical evidence
to support this view. They show that firms reduce their use of debt after
corporate governance improvements. Finally, we note that the control variables
are, by and large, of the correct sign and statistically significant; larger firms and
those with a greater proportion of tangible assets use more debt. Consistent
with the pecking order hypothesis, but not the trade-off model, profitable firms
use less debt financing.
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates for regressions where the dependent
variables are the debt maturity ratios. This allows us to examine the validity of
our second hypothesis through an examination of the composition of the debt
portfolio. For both groups of firms, there is evidence to support our hypothesis.
Focusing on the long- and short-term debt to assets ratios supports our predic-
tion that investability is associated with a lengthening of the debt maturity.
However, the way in which this lengthening of the debt maturity is achieved
varies between the two types of firm. For DC firms, it is simply a re-balancing of
the debt portfolio between long- and short-term debts. Whether measured
relative to assets or equity, long-term (short-term) debt increases (decreases) for
DC firms post-liberalization. The change in the debt composition for SC firms is
somewhat different. SC firms clearly lengthen the maturity of their debt post-
liberalization as evidenced by the ratio of long-term to total debt. However, it
appears that both forms of debt fall – with greater statistical evidence in the case
of short-term debt, but short-term debt falls more quickly than long-term debt.
The overall effect is consistent with our first hypothesis that SC firms use less
debt financing, but that short-term debt becomes relatively less important,
leading to less, but, on average, longer-dated debt in their capital structures.
Although they have the highest dependence on debt financing, DC non-
investable firms have the shortest debt maturity, followed by their investable
10 Results differ for developed markets, e.g. using a sample of family-owned Canadian firms,
King and Santor (2008) find no significant differences in the amount of debt held by single-
and dual-class firms.
11 Chong (2010) and Lin et al. (2011) show that borrowing costs are much higher for firms with
excess control rights.
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Table 4 Investability, debt maturity and dual-class firms
Debt Maturity Ratio
Long-Term Debt
to Total Assets
Short-Term Debt
to Total Assets
Investable 0.004 (1.30) -0.017*** (6.20)
Investable ¥ DC 0.010** (2.04) -0.001 (0.11)
DC -0.020*** (4.62) 0.051*** (20.08)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ DC) 4.28** 3.77*
# Obs 9,803 9,803
Controls Included Included
R2 0.461 0.626
Debt Maturity Ratio
Long-Term Debt
to Equity
Short-Term Debt
to Equity
Investable -0.018* (1.90) -0.052*** (4.75)
Investable ¥ DC 0.026* (1.65) -0.010 (0.50)
DC -0.022* (1.73) 0.118*** (11.79)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ DC) 0.77 5.78**
# Obs 9,803 9,803
Controls Included Included
R2 0.673 0.636
Debt Maturity Ratio
Long-Term Debt
to Total Debt
Total Debt
to Equity
Investable 0.020*** (3.34) -0.025* (1.66)
Investable ¥ DC 0.001 (0.04) 0.010 (0.36)
DC -0.081*** (16.68) 0.082*** (5.53)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ DC) 0.99 0.03
# Obs 9,803 9,803
Controls Included Included
R2 0.612 0.623
This table reports coefficient estimates from fixed effects vector decomposition regressions with
t-statistics (absolute value) adjusted for firm-level clustering presented underneath. The depen-
dent variable is long-term debt to assets, long-term debt to equity, long-term debt to total debt,
short-term debt to assets, short-term debt to equity, and total debt to equity, as indicated.
Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 in years in which the firm is designated as
investable. DC is an indicator variable, which is 1 if the firm is a dual-class share firm. Also
estimated, but not reported, are a constant, firm-level controls (size, growth opportunities,
tangibility, profitability) and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by
***, **, * for the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. #Obs is the number of observations.
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counterparts. Both SC firm types typically employ longer-maturity debt than
DC firms, with investable firms again using, on average, longer-dated instru-
ments than their non-investable equivalents. Hence, it appears that for a given
ownership structure (and its associated governance and information regime),
becoming investable allows firms to lengthen their debt maturity structure. The
lengthening of debt maturity post-liberalization is consistent with Agca et al.
(2007), who show that stock market reforms in emerging markets serve to
lengthen corporate debt maturity. In contrast, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006)
find that stock market liberalizations (using country-specific dates) are associ-
ated with greater use of short-term debt for emerging market firms.
We next focus on hypothesis 3 by examining the ratios of long- and short-
term debts to equity.12 From these we can assess the type of substitution effects
that are taking place in terms to changes to capital structure. Once more, the
results for SC firms are consistent with the financing patterns predicted in
hypothesis 3. SC investable firms are found to have the lowest ratio of total debt
to equity, suggesting that they use more equity finance as a source of long-term
financing post-liberalization. Admittedly, these findings are not definitive proof
that SC firms use more equity after becoming investable. For example, in the
long-term debt to equity regressions, the negative coefficient may arise because
of falling long-term debt, with no change in equity. To try and overcome this
shortcoming, we estimate Eq. (3) with net equity issuance13 as the dependent
variable (unreported). This yields a coefficient on the investable dummy that is
positive (0.059), and statistically significant (t-stat is 13.72). Thus, the evidence
is consistent with our hypothesis that, post-liberalization SC firms enjoy greater
access to equity financing and re-balance their capital structures away from debt
instruments. This is consistent with the view that institutional equity investors,
foreign investors in this instance, are more likely to invest in firms that practice
sound corporate governance (see Ferreira and Matos 2008; Li et al. 2008; Leuz
et al. 2009). Focusing specifically on stock market liberalizations, Bae and Goyal
(2010) show that better-governed firms enjoy the largest gains from such
programs, in terms of stock price revaluations and changes in investment.
O’Connor (2012) finds likewise for investable firms from a broader sample of
emerging market countries. In contrast, DC firms show no clear pattern post-
liberalization. They display no tendency to increase the proportion of equity
financing employed. In fact, SC non-investable firms still typically have greater
equity investment. As discussed earlier, the main change for DC firms is a
lengthening of the debt maturity.
As hypothesized, there is a differential effect on capital structure decisions for
firms who employ differing ownership structures prior to liberalization. SC firms
12 Table 4 also reports these ratios with total assets as the denominator. However, our findings
are similar so we limit our discussion to long- and short-term debts to equity.
13 This is defined as the change in book equity less the change in retained earnings all scaled
by book assets as per Baker and Wurgler (2002). A potential shortcoming with this variable
is the lack of data availability on ‘retained earnings’, e.g. we are left with only 3252 firm-year
observations remain compared with 9803 in our original sample.
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clearly reap the greater benefits, being able to reduce their debt reliance and
lengthen the maturity structure of the debt portfolios. They also appear
to substitute debt with equity financing. DC firms, on the other hand, have
little changed capital structures post-liberalization, but benefits accrue by a
re-balancing of their debt portfolios toward longer-maturity instruments. This
alleviates their exposure to rollover risk and short-run liquidity shortages in
debt markets.
Furthermore, we observe that DC non-investable firms rely most heavily on
debt and in particular, short-term debt financing. Given that their investable
counterparts reduce short-term debt reliance post-liberalization, it would appear
that they continue to be constrained from accessing longer-maturity markets.
This result is consistent with the view that foreign institutional investors are
reluctant to invest in poorly governed firms. Where such investment takes
place, short-term instruments facilitate greater monitoring and scrutiny of
operations.
Combining the results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that a hierarchy of access
to financial markets exists, with well-governed SC firms having fewer restric-
tions than DC firms. Equity investors favor SC investable firms above all others.
The ownership structure, with its associated poor governance and information
asymmetries, restricts DC firms to finance their operations largely in debt
markets, but firm-specific reforms and investability can be used to gain greater
access to long-dated bond markets and hence lengthen the maturity structure of
debt. It should also be noted that in both Tables 3 and 4, that the control
variables are, by and large, of the correct sign and statistically significant; larger
firms and those with a greater proportion of tangible assets use more debt.14
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
A. Alternative estimation methods
In Table 5, we reestimate the impact of investability on the debt and debt
maturity structures of SC and DC investable firms using a series of alternative
estimators which permit the inclusion of time-invariant regressors. We present
coefficient estimates using random effects, pooled OLS and pooled OLS
using Mundlak (1978) terms (i.e. time averages of the time-variant regressors)
included to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity. Results are generally consistent
with those reported earlier. SC firms employ less debt after the liberalization
event without any statistically significant change in the use of debt for DC firm.
Therefore, only SC firms are consistent with the predictions of our first hypoth-
esis. There is some evidence that both SC and DC firms use longer-maturity debt
compared with their non-investable counterparts. Now, this pattern is much
14 In unreported regressions, we also show that our results are robust to the inclusion of
‘indirect investable’ measures, namely international cross-listings in the United States and
the introduction of country funds.
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clearer for DC than SC firms. The F-tests for joint significance of the investable
firms confirm that investability is associated with a lengthening of the debt
maturity structure as predicted by hypothesis 2. Finally, SC firms appear to shift
their capital structures toward equity post-liberalization while DC firms substi-
tute short-term for long-term debt upon becoming investable. Admittedly, the
evidence for SC firms is less compelling using these alternative estimators, but
nonetheless the coefficient signs are consistent with the earlier story.
An interesting feature of Table 5 is how the coefficient estimate on the DC
firm dummy variable in the debt regressions is different in sign from that
estimated in the fixed effects vector decomposition regressions. Using random
effects, pooled OLS, and pooled OLS using Mundlak (1978) terms, the sign on
the dual-class dummy variable is statistically negative, and not positive, as
before. These findings suggest that failure to control for unobserved heteroge-
neity (in the case of pooled OLS), or allow for correlation between the unob-
served heterogeneity and the observable variables (in the case of random effects
estimation) alters the relationship between firm debt and ownership structure
(i.e. single versus dual-class shares). In the case of the Mundlak (1978) regres-
sions, the findings suggest that the Mundlak (1978) terms may not adequately
account for the unobserved heterogeneity. Other studies have reported similar
findings. Davies et al. (2008) find that the sign on time-invariant variables
differs across pooled OLS and FEVD regressions. Lee and Huh (2009) find
likewise when they compare random effects and FEVD regressions. This serves
to highlight the dangers of not adequately dealing with unobserved heteroge-
neity and/or its correlation with observed variables.
B. Alternative definition of corporate governance
Because one potential channel through which the documented effects could
materialize is the difference in governance regimes (and associated agency
conflicts) that exist between SC and DC firms, we employ an alternative
measure of corporate governance to check the robustness of our results. This
measure is based on the pre-liberalization proportion of closely held shares in a
firm, with higher proportions indicating better governance. Firms with a larger
percentage of closely held shares (to total common shares outstanding) are
likely to suffer less from agency conflicts since the incentives of the controlling
insiders and non-controlling minority outsiders are likely to better aligned.
Consistent with this view, Mitton (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) show how
firm profitability and value is greater the larger the ownership (cashflow) stake
held by controlling insiders. We divide our sample into quartiles and use the
highest (lowest) quartile of ‘closely held shares’ to proxy for better (poorer)
governed firms.15 A caveat is that the free-float i.e. the amount of shares
15 We also divided our sample at the median, with the above (below) median group represent-
ing relatively better (poorer) governed firms, but found that many firms were located near
the median making it difficult to attach any statistical significance to our results. Results are
available upon request.
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available to purchase decreases as the controlling stake of the insiders increases.
Hence, this potentially biases our coefficients for better-governed firms (i.e. with
most closely held shares) because foreign investor participation may be limited,
and thus their effect on the firm’s capital structure reduced.
In general, the coefficients are less precisely estimated, but the coefficient
signs are generally supportive of the earlier reported results. Again, investability
is only associated with less reliance on debt for the group of better-governed
firms and as such their behavior is consistent with our first hypothesis.
However, poorer-governed firms show no reduction in debt financing post
investability.
Turning to hypotheses 2 and 3, the results in Table 6 are somewhat mixed.
Any concrete conclusions are hampered by the lack of statistical significance
attached to the estimates. Firms with better governance regimes reduce both
long- and short-term debts (relative to assets and equity) with a quicker decline
in shorter maturity instruments. This is consistent with results from before and
leads to a lengthening of the maturity of the debt component of financing.
Furthermore, there is again some tentative evidence consistent with hypothesis
3 that better governed firms shift toward equity. Taken together, the evidence is
broadly consistent with our hypotheses for better-governed firms. In contrast,
there is little statistical evidence that investability is associated with any
changes in financing behavior for the most poorly governed firms in our
sample. Therefore, based on this proxy for governance, the poorly governed
firms do not behave as predicted.
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyze changes to corporate financing behavior of firms who have become
investable through firm-specific reforms, but differ in ownership structures
before the event. Previous literature has typically treated all firms the same in
examining this issue, but we hypothesize that all firms should not be expected
to respond homogeneously given that the extant literature has documented
important differences between firms with different ownership structures prior to
liberalization. Based on well-known theories of the firm, we formulate and test
a number of hypotheses of how firms’ financing decisions might be expected to
behave after a stock market liberalization event. Using firm-specific liberaliza-
tion dates, we estimate these potentially diverse responses. We adopt a FEVD
regression technique, which allows us to include time-invariant variables into
our model. The data support all three hypotheses for SC firms, while DC firms
behave as predicted in the case of hypotheses 2 and 3, but violate our first
hypothesis. Investability allows SC firms to become less reliant on debt financ-
ing and to lengthen the maturity of the debt employed relative to non-
investable firms. DC firms show no tendency to change the proportion of debt
financing, but we do find evidence of a lengthening of the debt maturity
structure. Interestingly, the empirical evidence also suggests that becoming
investable confers different advantages on SC and DC firms as predicted by
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Table 6 Investability, debt, debt maturity and corporate governance
Book Debt Net Debt
Investable -0.011* (1.80) -0.010* (1.66)
Investable ¥ low governance 0.005 (0.70) 0.005 (0.63)
Low governance 0.011*** (5.65) -0.025*** (10.81)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ low governance) 0.89 0.67
# Obs 6,177 6,177
R2 0.759 0.769
Long-Term Debt
to Total Assets
Short-Term Debt
to Total Assets
Investable -0.011 (0.22) -0.010** (2.04)
Investable ¥ low governance 0.001 (0.03) 0.004 (0.96)
Low governance 0.098*** (32.38) 0.001 (0.28)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ low governance) 0.03 0.42
# Obs 6,177 6,177
R2 0.401 0.630
Long-Term Debt
to Equity
Short-Term Debt
to Equity
Investable -0.022* (1.66) -0.041*** (3.25)
Investable ¥ low governance 0.018 (0.89) 0.029 (1.52)
Low governance 0.010 (1.24) 0.010 (1.52)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ low governance) 0.06 0.55
# Obs 6,177 6,177
R2 0.659 0.647
Long-Term Debt
to Total Debt
Total Debt
to Equity
Investable -0.010 (0.55) -0.049** (2.43)
Investable ¥ low governance -0.010 (0.57) 0.042 (1.55)
Low governance 0.068*** (21.74) -0.010 (0.76)
Time dummies and time-invariant effects Included Included
F-stat (investable + investable ¥ low governance) 1.24 0.11
# Obs 6,177 6,177
R2 0.595 0.618
This table reports coefficient estimates from fixed effects vector decomposition regressions with
t-statistics (absolute value) adjusted for firm-level clustering presented underneath. The dependent
variable is book debt (total debt to total assets) or net debt (to assets), long-term debt to assets, long-term
debt to equity, long-term debt to total debt, short-term debt to assets, short-term debt to equity and total
debt to equity, as indicated. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 in years in which the
firm is designated as investable. Low governance equals 1 if the investable firm’s pre-investable (median)
closely held shares (as a % of total shares outstanding) are in the bottom quartile. All investable firms
with (median) pre-investable closely held shares (as a % of total shares outstanding) in the interquartile
range are excluded. Firm size as the log of real sales in US$; growth opportunities is book value of debt
plus market capitalization to book assets; tangibility is calculated as fixed assets to total assets, and
profitability as earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization to total assets. Also
estimated but not reported are a constant, and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is
denoted by ***, **, * for the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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hypothesis 3. Because firms are different prior to the event, their ability to take
advantage of their newly liberalized status is also different. Both sets of firms
move along the pecking order. In particular, SC firms shift their capital struc-
tures by employing less debt and using increasing amounts of equity financing.
On the other hand, DC firms change their financing patterns by lengthening
the maturity structure of their debt without significantly altering their capital
structures. Investability does not enable them to totally overcome the obstacles
associated with their ownership structure, but it does remove some of the
restrictions in accessing long-maturity sources of finance.
Adopting different estimation techniques and a different proxy for corporate
governance provides a largely consistent story, although results based on the
alternative measure of governance quality are less precise. Therefore, we can
more confidently argue that our results pertain to pre-liberalization ownership
structures (SC and DC) and more cautiously to corporate governance. However,
issues surrounding the availability of shares for purchase in our ‘closely held
shares’ measure of governance may explain some of the ambiguity in our
results.
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